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IT HAS TAKEN EUROPE LONGER THAN THE US to
wake up to the consequences of the rise of China.
In the early 2000s, the implications for trade,
money and finance were already widely discussed
in the US, but the European debates of the time
were less sophisticated and less emotional. Con-
sequently, there was much less policy discussion
about what Europe expects from China as a part-
ner and as a player in the world economy.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from
this observation that policy developments in
China are less consequential for Europe than for
the US, and that China can therefore pay no atten-
tion to the evolution of European perceptions and
positions regarding its emergence and global role.
On the contrary, Europe has many reasons to be
attentive to, hopeful for, and sometimes con-
cerned by, the rise of China and its economic and
geopolitical consequences. Pisani-Ferry and Sapir
(2008) list eight ways in which China’s growth
will have a clear impact on Europe:
1 Europe’s industry is at risk of being squeezed
between the US and China;
2 Dysfunctional European labour markets add to
the adjustment cost;
3 Chinese integration into the world economy
may interfere with the process of European
integration;
4 Europe’s key trade relations are being desta-
bilised by Chinese competition;
5 China’s efforts to secure access to energy and
raw materials impacts on an import-dependent
European Union;
6 Europe’s and China’s positions on climate
change may result in conflict over greenhouse-
gas emission containment and its trade impli-
cations;
7 The exchange rate of the euro risks being the
ultimate adjustment variable;
8. China’s rise to world-economic-power status is
bound to reduce the Europe's weight in the gov-
ernance of international organisations.
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir point out that it would be
unwise to ignore the challenges that arise from
these risks, and the potential roadblocks on the
way to the development of smooth economic rela-
tions between China and the EU. They recommend
that policymakers from both sides should estab-
lish a far-reaching dialogue on the possible risks
and the appropriate responses.
Building on Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2008), the
aim of this paper is to look ahead and examine
what Europe expects from China economically
over the next ten years or so. It addresses in turn
two issues of particular importance, one of a
rather short-term nature and one of a more long-
term nature:
1 The rebalancing of global growth, and 
2 The strengthening of global governance.
Both issues are multilateral in essence. However
the focus here is on their implications for Europe,
China and the economic relationship between
them.
1 THE REBALANCING OF GLOBAL GROWTH
The rebalancing of global growth is probably the
main economic challenge of the next few years.
Whereas economists hold different views on the
role in the financial crisis of macroeconomic fac-
tors in general, and global imbalances in particu-
lar, few dispute that the strength and
sustainability of global growth will largely depend
on the degree to which a rebalancing of global
demand takes place (see for a recent discussion
Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2009).
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consumer as an engine of growth. From the mid-
1990s to at least the mid-2000s, US households
contributed strongly to global demand. This has
most likely ended, as households have suffered a
deterioration of their balance sheets and now
need to deleverage and save. True, a large part of
the savings adjustment has taken place during the
crisis. But public saving will have to increase to
reduce the now-huge US budgetary deficit, and
this will weigh on domestic demand. So, a major
question at G20 level is who, among the US's part-
ners, is going to help offset the corresponding
slowdown in global demand.
This discussion evidently involves quantity and
price dimensions. Although they are two sides of
the same coin, it is clearer to address them in
sequence.
i Global demand
Figure 1 gives the contributions to world growth
of both total GDP growth and domestic household
consumption growth in the US, the EU and China
from 2000-081. It uses three different indicators:
• The contribution of each country or region to
global GDP growth, using Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP) weights for standard global growth
calculations2; this indicator shows where
growth in the supplyof goods and services took
place, irrespective of where demand came from.
• The contribution of household consumption to
global GDP growth, using the same weights as
for the first indicator; this indicator represents
what the contribution of consumption to aggre-
gate world growth as usually measured has
been in each country or region. It can be inter-
preted as indicating where demand has come
from.
• The third indicator is similar to the second, but
for the country weights. Nominal (current dol-
lars) GDP weights are used instead of PPP
weights; this indicator has relevance in terms
of market size and the region’s ability to gener-
ate demand for imports3. If Chinese or European
consumption is to replace US consumption,
what matters for any given producer is the
dollar amount of consumption they are going to
generate. So this third indicator is relevant from
a demand substitutionpoint of view.
What is striking is how different a picture the three
indicators give. From a supply-side point of view
1.Data are 2005 PPP-
weighted.
2. Such as, for example,
those of the International
Monetary Fund as
presented in the World
Economic Outlook reports. 
3. It is not by accident that
the same approach is used
in the McKinsey report on
the Chinese consumer (MGI,
2009).
Figure 1a: Contributions of the EU, the US and China
to world growth, 2001-08
(weighted by share of world GDP in 2005, PPP) 
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Figure 1b: Contributions of household consumption
in the EU, the US and China to world growth, 2001-08
(weighted by share of world GDP in 2005, PPP) 
Figure 1c: Contributions of household consumption
in the EU, the US and China to world growth, 2001-08
(weighted by share of world GDP in 2005, current prices) 
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Source: IMF, national accounts, Bruegel calculations.
Figure 1: Alternative indicators of contributions
to growth in global demand, 2001-08
03
Jean Pisani-Ferry CHINA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION(Figure 1a), China has been the main engine of
growth throughout the period. From a demand
point of view, the US was the driving force in the
first half of the decade, before it was overtaken by
China after 2006 (Figure 1b). So it would appear
that China’s consumption has already substituted
US consumption. But if one uses current dollar
weights, the contribution of China’s consumption
has been consistently dwarfed by those of US and
European consumption (Figure 1c). From this per-
spective it would appear that Chinese consump-
tion will not be able to substitute US consumption,
even if Chinese consumption grows at a much
faster rate.
Figures 1b and 1c appear to provide incompatible
pieces of evidence. They do not. The reason why
they give such different pictures is that China’s
share of world current dollars GDP is much lower
that its share in PPP dollars GDP. As consumers
everywhere primarily consume domestically-pro-
duced goods and services, Figure 1b is accurate
in describing where the demand driving world GDP
growth came from. But when asking whether a
one-dollar drop in US consumption can be substi-
tuted by a one-dollar increase in Chinese con-
sumption, one must look at Figure 1c.
China certainly has potential for strongly increas-
ing its domestic consumption. The fact that the
share of consumption in GDP dropped from 46 per-
cent in 2000 to 36 percent in 2007 provides a
strong indication of this potential, and China’s
partners have every reason to insist that China
acts on it. In both the G20 and in bilateral talks,
the Europeans will no doubt join the US in asking
for Chinese rebalancing towards a more domesti-
cally-led, consumer-driven growth pattern.
To a certain extent this rebalancing has already
started. For the first time, the emerging countries’
relative contributions to the global 2009 stimulus
have exceeded those of the developed countries,
at least as regards its discretionary part (Figure
2). And beyond the one-time stimulus, a more fun-
damental and lasting rebalancing in favour of pri-
vate domestic demand is called for in those parts
of the emerging world that have the possibility to
engineer it. China, with its large current-account
surplus, as a consequence of an exceptionally
high domestic-saving rate, and the potential for a
rebound of the share of consumption in GDP, is a
prime candidate for a structural, sustained rebal-
ancing of the sources of global demand.
However, the message from Figures 1a-1c is that
China alone cannot substitute US demand. Other
parts of the world must play a role in the rebal-
ancing. What, then, about Europe? Although the
EU as a whole, where the current account is close
to equilibrium and which did not experience a gen-
eralised real-estate boom in the 2000s, does not
suffer from macroeconomic imbalance, pes-
simism prevails as regards its ability to generate
domestically led growth. To start with, consump-
tion in the EU is bound to grow slowly as a conse-
quence of the required consolidation of public
finances, lingering banking-sector weaknesses in
parts of the continent, and the creeping impacts of
ageing populations – not to mention the financing
strains of Greece and Portugal. In order to stabilise
the debt-to-GDP ratios, the European Commission
012345
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Figure 2: Contributions to the 2009 stimulus by
G20 member countries
Source: IMF (Horton et al, 2009), Bruegel calculations.
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adjustment of about one percent of GDP per year
for several years from 2011. This is likely to repre-
sent for a corresponding period a significant drag
on domestic demand growth in the EU.
This implies that the EU is unlikely to provide a
strong engine for world growth and might, on the
contrary, rely on external demand for the next few
years. There are however two caveats. First, situa-
tions differ within the EU and even within the euro
area. Germany has a large current-account sur-
plus, a relatively moderate budget deficit, stable
real-estate prices and a corporate sector whose
profitability strengthened in the years preceding
the crisis, and is thus in a much better position to
exhibit domestically led growth than the UK or
Spain, where opposite conditions prevail4. Second,
even if Europe is unable to engineer a significant
expansion of domestic demand, no region can be
exempted from contributing to lifting global
demand while there are grounds to fear that it will
remain weak until the deleveraging process is
completed. Europe can play its part by designing
a growth programme for the next few years. For
maximum impact, Europe should go beyond the
structural-reform mantra and select and imple-
ment those structural reforms that have the most
potential for stimulating demand in the short run,
such as pension reforms, green investments and
a deepening of EU-wide market integration5.
Institutionally, Europe's approach to global
discussions is ambiguous. The EU and especially
the euro area insist that the bloc should be taken
as a whole and that the current-account balances
of individual countries are irrelevant. But member
states also insist that a number of policy levers
such as budgetary policy, tax policy and labour-
market policies remain in their hands and that, in
international forums, the EU can speak for them
only where it has explicit competence. It remains
to be seen if, and on what issues, G20 policy
discussions will involve individual countries.
ii Current accounts and exchange rates
While there are similarities between the US and
European situations as regards the outlook for
domestic demand, which naturally leads the two
advanced regions to express similar preferences
for domestic demand-led growth in China, no such
similarity exists as regards current accounts. The
US and Europe even seem to be in radically differ-
ent situations: whereas the US economy has
recorded persistently high current-account
deficits since the early 2000s, and is likely to
remain in significant deficit in the years to come,
both the euro area and the EU as a whole are close
to equilibrium and are projected to remain in this
position. China and the US are therefore set to
remain in opposite situations (Figure 3), with
Europe playing the role of an ‘innocent bystander’
in what looks like an essentially US-China game.
From this observation it would however be wrong
to conclude that Europe is, or can be indifferent to
the modalities of current-account adjustment, and
more specifically to the ongoing discussion on the
exchange rate of the renmimbi (RMB). To start
4. Germany has a
weakness, however, in the
state of its banking sector. 
5. For a discussion of
Europe’s medium-term
priorities see Sapir (2009)
and the contribution
therein.
‘Institutionally, Europe's approach to global discussions is ambiguous. The EU insists that the
bloc should be taken as a whole and the current-account balances of individual countries are
irrelevant. But member states insist that a number of policy levers remain in their hands.’
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database and projections.
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nese growth towards internal demand while ignor-
ing its exchange-rate consequences. More
domestic demand in China has to go hand-in-hand
with less foreign demand, which implies a price
adjustment. The exchange rate is the variable that
can make rebalancing consistent with China
remaining on a non-inflationary growth path.
More specifically, there are three reasons why
Europe is concerned by China’s surplus:
• First, Europe has a bilateral trade deficit with
China and this deficit was in 2008 almost as
large as that of the US (Figure 4). Whereas
bilateral trade balances are irrelevant macro-
economically, the imbalanced character of
trade with China grabs attention and is there-
fore important from a political economy stand-
point. In addition, current-account balances are
very polarised within the EU, with Germany in
significant surplus and most other member
countries in deficit. Especially, all the other
major countries – France, Italy, Poland, Spain
and the UK – recorded non-negligible deficits
in the years before the outbreak of the crisis
(some have temporarily shrunk as a conse-
quence of the recession). While national cur-
rent-account deficits are of lesser economic
importance for the countries participating in
the euro, they cannot be overlooked altogether:
they are indicators of underlying vulnerabilities
and they also matter from a political economy
standpoint6. They are actually bound to matter
more in the aftermath of the crisis than in the
years preceding it.
• Second, to the extent that the US dollar needs in
the medium term to depreciate in effective
terms in the context of the rebalancing of US
growth, the persistence of a fixed link between
the RMB and the dollar leads the euro and other
European currencies to play the role of an
adjustment variable, which involves the risk of
disproportionate appreciation. In other words,
for any given effective depreciation of the US
dollar, RMB appreciation and euro appreciation
are substitutes for one another. In this context
the rigidity of the USD-RMB exchange rate,
potentially at least, has detrimental impacts on
the exchange rate of the European currencies7.
This concern has been voiced for some time in
Europe but it is of increasing relevance when,
as presently, global demand is weak and all
countries face the risk of ‘competitive depreci-
ation’.
• Third, the evolution of the US-China monetary
relationship could also affect the euro through
a portfolio channel. As long as the RMB remains
in a fixed link with the US dollar, the People's
Bank of China (PBOC) will be a large buyer of US
dollars assets, thus contributing to limiting the
depreciation of the US dollar vis-à-vis third cur-
rencies, including the euro. This helps prevent
the risk of a major appreciation of the euro vis-
à-vis the dollar, over and above the levels
reached so far8.
This last point suggests that the Europeans could
in fact be ambiguous vis-à-vis China’s exchange-
rate policy. On the one hand, it seems, an appreci-
ation of the RMB would relieve the euro of
appreciation pressures stemming from the cur-
rent account, but on the other hand a move
towards delinking the RMB from the USD is likely to
imply Chinese reserve diversification into euros
and a pressure towards appreciation stemming
from the financial account.
From a European point of view this is in fact a gen-
uine intertemporal trade-off. The longer the RMB
6. Whether current-account
balances matter within
a monetary union has
been the topic for an as
yet inconclusive
discussion. They were
generally overlooked
during the first decade
of EMU while the focus
was put on budgetary
deficits. However the
later experience of some
countries such as Spain,
whose budget was in
surplus while it recorded
a current account deficit
close to 10 percent of
GDP in 2007, has drawn
attention to current
accounts. They are now
considered indicators of
the sustainable
character of growth
patterns and are likely
to become the focus of
increasing attention in
the context of EU
surveillance.
7. See for example Ahearne
et al(2007). For a
systematic analysis see
Bénassy-Quéré et al
(2008).
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large US current-account deficits are going to per-
sist and the larger the net foreign liabilities posi-
tion of the US economy is going to grow. So the fact
that China resists RMB appreciation vis-à-vis the
dollar and, even more significantly, the fact that it
remains in a fixed exchange-rate regime, may limit
euro appreciation in the short run, but at the price
of a larger eventual appreciation9.
Identifying the most desirable scenario from a
European point of view thus depends on time pref-
erences. In a crisis, future benefits tend to be dis-
counted more heavily than in normal times, and –
in addition to distractions caused by more imme-
diate concerns – this may explain why in 2008
and in early 2009 the Europeans were not
adamant about the need to reform China’s
exchange-rate policy. But the end of the recession
is increasingly focusing attention on the medium
term and the need to put world growth on a sus-
tainable path. Europeans have become convinced
that the current monetary relationship between
China and the US is not sustainable and they are
likely to insist more and more that it should be
reformed. This suggests that the issue will gain
prominence, both in the context of the multilateral
G20 discussions that were initiated in Pittsburgh,
and in bilateral talks.
An important topic for bilateral and multilateral
discussions is the management of the transition
to a new RMB exchange-rate regime. Its effect on
the euro will depend on the extent and pace of
China’s reserve diversification, which is a policy
variable, and on the way it is communicated to the
markets. Europeans have every reason to advo-
cate a very gradual move that would avoid abrupt
euro appreciation. This is a topic they are naturally
keen on discussing with their Chinese partners10.
The current context of euro weakness – as a con-
sequence of concerns over the strength of the
euro area and the way it is going to manage pos-
sible funding crises within it – paradoxically pro-
vides an excellent opportunity for discussions.
Unless it is assumed that the euro area will ulti-
mately break-up, which is very unlikely, the
medium-term issues are bound to re-emerge at
some point. In-depth discussions held in the
meantime would help in addressing tensions
when they eventually arise.
2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The launch of the G20-summits process and the
enlargement of the Financial Stability Forum have
accelerated a trend already visible in the rapid
strengthening of China’s standing in the World
Trade Organisation and in international climate
discussions, and in the debate over International
Monetary Fund governance. Global institutions
and global governance forums are in the process
of adjusting to the increased weight and
assertiveness of China and of the large emerging
countries. In fact, this process started in 2003
with the failure of the Cancun WTO ministerial con-
ference, which led the US and the EU to realise that
it was no longer enough to reach agreement
between them to open the way for a global trade
agreement. Further important steps were the first
G20 summit in November 2008, and the Copen-
hagen climate summit in December 2009. At both
of these, the main negotiations took place
between the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil,
South Africa, India and China).
Adjustment of the global governance structures to
new economic realities is bound to be a protracted
process that will continue through, and beyond,
the current decade. How it will develop is of major
importance for the EU, China, and their mutual
relationship.
i Europe’s view of the world
More than any of the other main players, Euro-
peans are natural champions of global gover-
nance. They have been practising cooperation
through international institutions and shared sov-
ereignty for more than 50 years. These have
become part of the EU’s genetic code. As pointed
out by Robert Kagan (2003), Europeans inhabit a
world where the rule of law and the culture of com-
promise have replaced sheer power, and where
large countries have to listen to smaller ones and
8. Another way to say the
same thing is that as long
as the RMB remains pegged
to the dollar and as long as
the PBOC intervenes with
unlimited funds to keep the
bilateral exchange rate
stable, the US and China de
facto constitute a currency
zone, and what matters
from a portfolio point of
view is the aggregate US-
China current-account
balance, which has reached
a rough balance in 2009
and is moving into surplus.
Obviously this view – first
promoted in 2003 by
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau
and Garber – is a
simplification, especially
because foreign-exchange
markets do not assume
that the USD-RMB link is a
permanent one.
9. A framework for
discussing this trade-off is
provided by Blanchard,
Giavazzi and Sa (2005).
See Pisani-Ferry (2007) for
a more developed
discussion.
10. This remains true in a
context in which the euro
has been depreciating
because of concerns over
divergences within the euro
area and its internal
governance.
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explains why Europe spontaneously feels at home
in the intricacies of multi-level government, why
it has such a large stake in the build-up of a rules-
based world economy, and why it so often sees
itself as a laboratory of global governance.
Furthermore, when European leaders in the late
2000s reflected on the consequences of globali-
sation for European integration they concluded
that the logical implication was that the EU should
immerse itself more in the governance of globali-
sation and play a stronger global role. Unlike the
1960s and the 1970s, when the aim was essen-
tially to integrate behind economic borders, EU
endorsement of trade, investment and capital-
market liberalisation in the 1980s and the 1990s
transformed the EU into a very open economy that
could no longer be defined as an inward-looking
economic bloc. At the same time, the appetite for
political integration was reducing, as indicated by
the reluctance to move to full ‘political union’ in
parallel to the creation of monetary union, and by
the rejection of the European constitutional treaty
in 2005. So in a globalising world, the EU is less
and less defined by differential cross-border eco-
nomic integration, but it cannot count on political
integration to provide an alternative identity. What
remains is, in large part, an emphasis on shared
preferences for the design of global rules. The
European heads of state and government thus
concluded in 2007 that their aim was to '[shape]
globalisation in the interests of all our citizens,
based on our common values and principles'.They
added that 'for this even the enlarged Union
cannot act alone', implying greater involvement in
global governance11.
Europe, however, has seen its global economic and
political weight erode fast. 
Economically, it is only thanks to a series of
enlargements that the EU’s share in the world
economy has remained roughly stable over four
decades at about 20 percent of the total (Figure
5). But barring the – now unlikely – rapid integra-
tion of Turkey and Ukraine, the potential for growth
by extending the EU's borders has now been
nearly exhausted. As the labour force, and then the
total population, start shrinking, the outlook is one
of accelerated relative decline in comparison to
countries with growing populations and/or a sig-
nificant potential for productivity catching up. This
is even the case if steady productivity improve-
ments are assumed (which have not been forth-
coming in the 2000s so far). Europe’s relative
weight is set to diminish even in comparison with
the US, because demographic outlooks differ
noticeably. This has little to do with economic suc-
cess, although under-performance can accelerate
the trend. Put simply, even successful mature
economies are bound to witness an erosion of
their relative power.
Economic trends have had major political conse-
quences already. Although European countries
have retained significant over-representation in
international economic organisations such as the
IMF, the World Bank and even the newly created
G20, the widely shared perception in the rest of
the world is that time has come for an overhaul.
US perceptions and priorities have also changed,
as indicated by the evolving recommendations of
an influential – and usually timely – Washington
voice, C Fred Bergsten:
‘The US and the EU are the world’s only economic
superpowers.They should form a 'G2 caucus'
11. In their ‘EU declaration
on globalisation’, annex
to European Council
Presidency Conclusions,
14 December 2007.
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mittee to manage their own economic relationship
and to provide leadership for the world economy.’
(Bergsten and Koch-Weser, 2003)
‘The United States will need to further develop and
nurture special ('G2') relationships in at least four
directions: with the EU, with China, with Japan and
with Saudi Arabia.’
(Bergsten, 2005)
‘[China is] a new economic superpower, along with
the US and the EU (which, however, speaks with a
single voice on only a few issues and thus cannot
form a G3 with the other two).’
(Bergsten, 2009)
The perspective of a world in which Europe does
not count enough to be represented at the top
table was vividly illustrated at the Copenhagen cli-
mate summit in December 2009, when the politi-
cal agreement that paved the way for the
Copenhagen Accord was negotiated between the
US president and the leaders of the BASIC coun-
tries in the absence of any European representa-
tive. This was a traumatic event for Europe, the full
consequences of which remain to be seen.
ii China, Europe and global governance: zero-sum
game dimensions
Facts are stubborn and it is best not to ignore
them. China’s rise is a real challenge to Europe’s
role in, and views on, global governance. Pure zero-
sum-game dimensions do exist, where China’s
growing influence and assertiveness contribute
to diminishing those of Europe, and are therefore
perceived as a threat. These dimensions need to
be identified, potentially divergent interests need
to be acknowledged, and disagreements have to
be addressed. At the same time there are positive-
sum-game dimensions that must equally be
recognised and on which cooperation can be built.
The zero-sum dimensions first arise from the objec-
tive factors listed in the previous section. Europe’s
global power, its role as a strategic economic part-
ner of the US, and its say in global governance, are
bound to diminish while China's are bound to
increase. Part of the problem is that, as history
abundantly shows, incumbent powers hang on to
the weight and influence they once had and are in
no hurry to relinquish them. China and other
emerging countries have every reason to insist
that significant adjustments need to be made to
the governance of international organisations and,
whatever they may say in public, Europeans know
that these adjustments are long overdue.
But the problem also has more subtle aspects, to
do with internal EU governance: the major Euro-
pean countries value their individual representa-
tion in international organisations and are
reluctant to relinquish it. A Europe whose share in
these organisations were reduced to, say, one-
fourth of seats and votes instead of one-third cur-
rently, would remain very powerful12. In fact it
would be nominally more powerful than the US
today. But to exercise this power effectively,
Europe would have to unify its representation and
therefore to put in place internal-governance
mechanisms that would ensure effective deci-
sion-making on external matters. This is by no
means a fantasy – it is already the case for inter-
national trade, for the international aspects of
competition policy and, for euro-area countries,
for exchange-rate policy. Meanwhile, proposals for
strengthening common external economic repre-
sentation have been discussed extensively13. But
national governments are reluctant to transfer
representation to the European Commission or
another body. External procrastination thus
reveals uncertainty and disputes over internal
governance, making Europe less able to adjust to
the rise of China14.
A second, more profound, dimension relates to
‘China’s rise is a real challenge to Europe’s role in global governance. China’s growing influence
and assertiveness contribute to diminishing those of Europe, and are therefore perceived as a
threat. Divergent interests need to be acknowledged, and disagreements have to be addressed.’
12. See Ahearne et al
(2007) for an overview of
Europe’s weight in
international organisations.
The one-third proportion
also applies to the G20. 
13. The new ‘Lisbon treaty’
governing the EU includes a
clause that would allow
unified representation in
international economic and
financial organisations.
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entists often characterise Europe as ‘post-West-
phalian’, meaning that the traumas of European
wars have led citizens, and their governments, to
shun nation-state assertiveness and embrace
supranational governance. Furthermore, as
endorsement of global rules has more than occa-
sionally been a way to resolve internal disputes,
the EU as a consequence sees the strengthening
of global governance and the strengthening of its
own internal unity as mutually reinforcing15.
Europe in this respect is very different to both
China and the US, where, obvious differences
apart, the structure of domestic power does not
bode well for the multiplication of binding external
commitments and where willingness to accept
encroachments on sovereignty is in consequence
limited. China especially has much less experi-
ence of participation in international arrange-
ments and as a still-developing country, it does
not have an abundant supply of internationally-
trained civil servants to take part in a multiplicity
of often highly-technical simultaneous interna-
tional negotiations. Furthermore, it sees such
existing international arrangements as a way of
preserving the global status quo and thus EU/US
power, at the expense of developing countries.
China is therefore naturally wary of the very same
complex web of international agreements and
institutions that Europe regards as the best pos-
sible guarantee of its own future prosperity.
For this reason, China’s rise (as well as India's and
those of other emerging powers) represents not
only a quantitative change. Qualitatively, it may
also shift the balance away from the global gov-
ernance-oriented agenda the Europeans are push-
ing for, and bring back to the fore a more
traditional, cruder and more nation-state-centric
view of international economic relations.
The Copenhagen climate summit was typical in
this respect, with Europe on one side coming to
the conference having already given binding com-
mitments and willing to enter into further com-
mitments on condition that partners joined it in
proportionate efforts. On the other side, the US and
China came to Copenhagen with different
objectives but both were reluctant to go beyond
limited, and, de facto, not really binding commit-
ments. The near-failure of the summit was
regarded in Europe as a major setback and as a
sign of the difficulty of reaching agreement on the
global governance agenda advocated by the Euro-
peans. While they blamed China less than the
overall negotiation framework and the attitude of
a small number of countries that made any formal
agreement impossible, the broader concern is
whether global governance can deliver as much as
Europe expects.
The degree to which China will be willing to engage
in, and develop ownership of, global governance
will be crucial in determining Europe’s attitudes
towards it. Europe still hopes that China will
actively take part in international discussions and
contribute to writing global rules. It admits that
this will require significant adjustment on its side
because it cannot expect China to underwrite the
rules already decided on by the US and Europe. But
it also fears that China’s ‘realist’ approach to inter-
national relations will dash its own hopes of the
emergence of a post-Westphalian world.
There are other areas in which Europe and China
can be portrayed as competitors, such as access
to natural resources and associated partnerships
with third countries. As an energy-poor and natu-
ral-resources-poor region, Europe especially is
fearful of terms-of-trade losses triggered by
China’s fast-growing demand for primary goods.
This is unavoidable and there is little China can do
to appease European fears.
However there is significant room for improvement
in one respect: China’s eagerness to enter into a
series of bilateral agreements with resource-pro-
ducing countries suggests that it regards bilater-
alism as a better guarantee of economic security
than multilateralism. True, it is not China that
invented bilateral agreements. But the combina-
tion of apparent lack of trust in multilateralism
and an apparent trust in bilateral deals is easily
perceived by Europeans as a threat to the type of
international relations they have confidence in.
This applies notably to Africa where, as traditional
14. These issues are
discussed in Coeuré and
Pisani-Ferry (2007).
15. This may in fact be
disputable as global
governance is in some
respects a substitute for
European governance.
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resource-poor Europe is disturbed by China’s
growing interest in securing access to natural
resources. But the issue is broader and, although
interests differ, discussions and compromises are
possible.
iii China, Europe and global governance: positive-
sum game dimensions
The existence of zero-sum-game issues should
not lead us to overlook positive-sum dimensions.
A first, and important, dimension that has poten-
tial implications for a wide range of policy areas, is
a shared preference for economic multipolarity.
Throughout the post-second world war era, Europe
has been a junior partner to the US, with whom it
had much in common but whose occasionally uni-
lateralist tendencies regularly caused concern.
The emergence of a new power, whose economic
weight is about to match that of the US and the EU,
represents an opportunity to renew pleas for a
more balanced world. This especially applies to
‘winner-takes-all’ issues, such as international
money and global regulation, where the dominant
power tends to have disproportionate influence in
comparison to its immediate followers. Here,
Europe may see in China’s rise an opportunity for
a more balanced structure of power in which it
could play a bigger role. By the same token, China,
which has been a consistent advocate of multipo-
larity, could see in Europe a partner with which it
could cooperate in the shaping of a new global
architecture.
This is not to say that Europe and China should
form an alliance to unsettle US power. US eco-
nomic and financial predominance is bound to
remain unchallenged for several decades. How-
ever the emergence of a more even balance of eco-
nomic power, where the weight of the predominant
country is diminished in relative terms, calls for
changes in the de facto structure of global gover-
nance and leadership.
This is especially apparent for monetary relations.
The dollar has played an overwhelming leadership
role until now, but there will be a growing mis-
match between the size of the dominant economy
and the role of the dominant currency. As Figure 6
indicates, the share of the main international cur-
rency-issuing economy in the world (the US) in
comparison to the shares of the next two
economies (currently China and the euro area) is
already lower than when sterling was replaced by
the dollar as the main international currency. It is
bound to decline further and faster. This is indica-
tive of the increasing fragility of an arrangement
that relies for the supply of the international cur-
rency on an economy that is getting weaker in rel-
ative terms.
Scholars of international monetary relations often
refer to ‘hegemonic stability’ theories, according
to which international monetary stability is best
guaranteed by assigning a leading role to the
largest country. The rationale for this view is that
a dominant power is in a position to internalise
international ‘externalities’ while this is more prob-
lematic in a competitive arrangement (see Kindel-
berger, 1973, and for a critical discussion
Eichengreen, 1987). It is hard to speak of hege-
monic stability, however, when the hegemon’s
objective power base shrinks. When this happens,
the country issuing the international currency
may be tempted to exploit this advantage to its
own profit, rather than to ensure global stability.
In other words, while hegemonic stability may
imply that it is better to have the world run by one
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that in a situation where economic power is more
evenly distributed, it is better to stick to hege-
monic arrangements.
While there is no direct rival to the dollar yet, our
analysis suggests there is a potential for the grad-
ual emergence of a multi-currency system in
which the euro and presumably also the RMB, or a
future common Asian currency, will play signifi-
cant regional roles and share with the dollar some
international-currency functions16. From a Euro-
pean point of view, China’s rise is an indication
that, in future, the euro, which is currently a dis-
tant second international currency, is unlikely to
remain alone in its dialogue with the US dollar, and
can become a building block for the monetary
system of the future. From a Chinese point of view,
the existence of the euro portends the eventual
emergence of a more balanced multi-currency
world.
A second positive-sum-game dimension arises
from a shared interest in regional cooperation.
Europe has long experience of regional arrange-
ments, the main result being today’s EU. China has
embarked on cooperation with neighbours, pri-
marily within the framework of the ASEAN+3
forum, and it shares with them a desire to
strengthen regional cooperation in the economic,
financial and monetary domains. East Asia in gen-
eral is wary of multilateral intrusions into areas of
traditional national sovereignty and is more sym-
pathetic to regional initiatives – as illustrated by
the attempt to create an Asian Monetary Fund in
the late 1990s and by the subsequent Chiang Mai
initiative.
How and to what degree multilateral and regional
arrangements can be made compatible and mutu-
ally consistent is a major issue for global gover-
nance. Trade specialists have discussed this for a
long time, as trade is the field where regionalism
first started to have an impact. But the question
also arises in the context of G20 discussions,
where EU authorities intend Europe to take part as
a single entity but lack the means to speak in the
name of all Europe. It also arises about the Euro-
peans’ reluctance to let the IMF intervene within
the euro area to assist countries in distress such
as Greece, while at the same time the EU has no
mechanism of its own that can substitute the IMF.
Europe’s experience in this respect is of interest
for Asia, and both regions can also help trigger an
international discussion on the multilateral
response to the regional challenge.
iv China, Europe and the US
In the light of the preceding analysis, there is a
risk that the EU and China could attempt create
rival G2s with the US. An implication of China’s
developing-country status is that its objective
weight in the world economy varies considerably
16. Pisani-Ferry and Posen
(2009) discuss how a
combination of
economic, governance
and geopolitical factors
explains why the euro is
not yet a rival to the US
dollar.
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simple comparative indicators (Figure 7). China
is heavyweight enough in some fields for no
meaningful international agreement to be possi-
ble without it (this is for example the case for trade
and greenhouse-gas emissions). But in other
fields China is a lightweight, and remains a junior
partner compared to the US and Europe (this is the
case for financial regulation, competition and still
– though less and less – for product standards).
Europe therefore could easily liaise with the US to
retain and exercise leadership in areas in which
China is still a junior power, while China could liaise
with the US to gain and exercise leadership in
areas in which it has become a more significant
player than Europe. This might appear to be a nat-
ural outcome, but it would be one in which the
potential for EU-China cooperation would not be
exploited.
3 CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis shows that in the coming
decade the economic rise of China is likely both to
generate friction with Europe and to create poten-
tial for fruitful cooperation. The question for poli-
cymakers on both sides is how to prevent
zero-sum dimensions from dominating and run-
ning the show. This requires high-quality dialogue
that acknowledges the potential for friction while
emphasising the potential for fruitful cooperation.
The current level of dialogue does not meet this
standard. On macroeconomic issues, Europe has
become more consistent, but the stance taken by
its representatives is not always backed by the
constituent member states, and the EU too often
pretends it is not really part of the solution to the
current macroeconomic dilemmas. Meanwhile,
China tends to procrastinate instead of defining
its medium-term macroeconomic strategy. On
governance, it is the Europeans who procrastinate
and display inconsistency, while China fails to
spell out what its conditions are for developing
genuine ownership of, and confidence in, the
global-governance institutions. On both sides, it is
high time to approach the short- and long-term
issues with more clarity and resolve.
Discussions within international forums such as
the G20 as well as bilateral consultations offer an
opportunity for improving the quality of the dia-
logue and making sure it focuses on issues of
major bilateral and global relevance. These oppor-
tunities should be seized.
REFERENCES
Ahearne, Alan, William R Cline, Kyung Tae Lee, Yung Chul Park, Jean Pisani-Ferry and John Williamson
(2007) ‘Global imbalances: time for action’, Bruegel Policy Brief2007/02
Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès, Amina Lahrèche-Révil and Valérie Mignon (2008) ‘Is Asia responsible for
exchange-rate misalignments within the G20?’, Pacific Economic Review13(1), pp. 48-61
Bergsten, C. Fred (2005) ‘A New Foreign Economic Policy for the United States’, in C. Fred Bergsten (ed),
The United States and the World Economy: Foreign Economic Policy for the Next Decade, Institute for
International Economics
Bergsten, C. Fred (2009) ‘The United States-China Economic Relationship and the Strategic and
Economic Dialogue’, testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global
Environment, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 10 September
Bergsten, C. Fred, and Caio Koch-Weser (2003) ‘Restoring the Transatlantic Alliance’, Financial Times,
6 October
Blanchard, Olivier, Francesco Giavazzi and Filippa Sa (2005) ‘The US Current Account and the Dollar’,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity2005-1, pp 1-66
Blanchard, Olivier, and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2009) ‘Global Imbalances: In Midstream’, Staff Position
NoteNo 09/29, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC
13
Jean Pisani-Ferry CHINA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONCoeuré, Benoît, and Jean Pisani-Ferry (2007) ‘The Governance of the European Union’s International
Economic Relations: How Many Voices?’, in André Sapir (ed) Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global
Economy, Bruegel, Brussels
Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber (2003) ‘An Essay on the Revived Bretton
Woods System’, NBER Working PaperNo 9971, NBER, Cambridge, Mass.
European Council (2007), ‘EU declaration on globalisation’, annex to European Council Presidency
Conclusions, 14 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/97669.pdf, accessed 5 March 2010
Fox, John, and François Godement (2009) ‘A Power Audit of EU-China Relations’, Policy report, European
Council on Foreign Relations
Kagan, Robert (2003) Paradise and Power – America and Europe in the new world order, Atlantic Books,
London
Kindelberger, Charles (1973) The World in Depression, University of California Press
McKinsey Global Institute (2009) ‘If you’ve got it, spend it: unleashing the Chinese consumer’,
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/unleashing_chinese_consumer/MGI_Unleashing_Chinese_
Consumer_full_report.pdf, accessed 5 March 2010
Pisani-Ferry, Jean (2008) ‘The end of Europe’s long-standing indifference to the renminbi’, in Morris
Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy (eds) Debating China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Peterson Institute for
International Economics
Pisani-Ferry, Jean, and Adam Posen (2009) The euro at 10: The next global currency?, Bruegel/Peterson
Institute for International Economics
Pisani-Ferry, Jean, and André Sapir (2008) ‘Eight Potential Roadblocks to Smooth EU-China Economic
Relations’, in Anders Aslund and Marek Dabrowski (eds) Challenges of Globalization: Imbalances and
Growth, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Sapir, André (ed) (2009) Memos to the New Commission, Bruegel, Brussels
14
CHINA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVEJean Pisani-Ferry
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION